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The imminent approach of the new millen-
nium is triggering much speculation about what
our collective future holds. Much of the specula-
tion stems from the fact that we, as a nation and a
global community, have experienced a very
profound change in our daily lives over a rela-
tively short period of time. In fact, on the heels of
the 1900s-a century of unparalleled growth and
advancement in technology, medicine, democ-
racy, and diplomacy, punctuated with sporadic
episodes of war and decline-there is a palpable
sense of heightened wonderment and anxiety
about what we can expect from the next century,
the benefits and forward-progress we will enjoy,
the responsibilities and duties we will shoulder,
and the perils we must avoid or overcome.
The twentieth century will certainly be
remembered as a period of recorded history that
was nearly unrivaled and was, at once, "inspiring,
at times horrifying, always fascinating."' As we ap-
proach the conclusion of the millennium, we find
ourselves standing at the leading edge of a new,
wondrous and transforming economic moment
(the so-called Digital Information Age), equal in
its importance to that of the agricultural and in-
dustrial revolutions. In the words of Alvin Toffler,
we are now riding the "Third Wave."2 This eco-
nomic revolution, similar to those that preceded
it, is being fueled by dramatic advances in tech-
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I See Walter Isaacson, Our Century ... And The Next One,
TIME, Apr. 13, 1998, at 70.
2 See Alvin Toffier, THE TitmD WAVE 1 (1991).
3 Moore's Law, which holds that the maximum process-
ing power of a microchip, at a given price, doubles roughly
every eighteen months, drives the blistering pace of
nology. Technology is evolving at a blinding rate
and appears hell-bent to change every facet of our
lives.3 It undoubtedly will, and the potential for
that is exciting.
Consider, for example, the accelerating perva-
siveness and transparency of technology, from
mainframes to personal computers to powerful
software applications and embedded
microprocessors, without which there would be
none of the innovative services and products that
many of us take for granted. Also consider that
the typical American household now has more
computer processing power than the entire Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (one of the
U.S. educational institutions that pioneered com-
puter and information sciences) did twenty years
ago .4
Engineers and technologists are creating ma-
chines every day that are smarter, faster and in-
creasingly untethered, while their software design
and programming counterparts are creating more
powerful and automated applications and systems.
The future of computerization, as a consequence,
will be characterized by powerful software applica-
tions and tiny embedded microprocessors burrow-
ing themselves into our daily lives. These ma-
chines and systems (no longer clumsy and
intrusive like personal computers) will be invisible
to the human eye and will be tremendously auton-
omous and intelligent. They will mimic and ac-
microprocessor innovation. See Kevin Werbach, OPP Work-
ing Paper No. 29, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Tele-
communications Policy, at 6 (1997); see also Rich Karlgaard,
Manager's Journal: Digital Warriors Want Baby Bells' Blood, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 8, 1997, at A24 (comparing the fact
that the "first microprocessor, the Intel 4004, could crunch
about 400 instructions a second" to the fact the current-gen-
eration Digital Alpha processor "can tick off some one billion
instructions a second").
4 See Remarks Of President Williamj Clinton Concerning The
Year 2000 Conversion (visited July 14, 1998) <http://
www.y2k.gov/new/presy2k.htm>.
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cess all of our senses, making the human-com-
puter experience of the future radically different
from today's. Ultimately, technology will allow us
to evolve from using just our touch to manipulate
the keyboard and our sight to interact with the
monitor to the use of all our five senses.5 The
possibilities are vast, only limited by physical time
(i.e., the speed of light) and biological time (i.e.,
the span of life).
6
Through the use of advanced technology
(namely telecommunications and information
services), we are also shrinking the world. Tech-
nology has opened, and will continue to open,
various industries-communications, data and in-
formation services, entertainment, software, elec-
tronics, and financial services-to new global con-
sumption, trade and investment. Ultimately,
technology will contribute to the complete inter-
connectedness of the entire global community.
But, as with all things, there is another side to
progress. New technology will also unveil novel
and unintended problems and adverse effects.
There are many anecdotes of the "not-so-pretty"
side of technology: some are technical in nature,
some are economic and legal, and some are cul-
tural and social. For example, in the technical
category, it is important to remember there is
probably not a single software application in use
or on the market today that is without defects or
"bugs." Many of these defects may never reveal
their presence but assuredly many will. On the
continuum of severity, there are the trivial, minor
nuisances associated with a popular spreadsheet
or operating system application and the poten-
tially catastrophic effects of the impending Unix
and C crises.
7
These unintended problems and adverse effects
amply highlight our growing dependence on au-
5 See Neil Gross, Into The Wild Frontier, Bus. WK., June 23,
1997, at 72 (in the future, computers will "respond to our
voices and extend our senses.").
6 See George Gilder, Regulating The Telecosm, CATO Policy
Report, Sept./Oct. 1997, at 1.
7 See Capers Jones, Bad Days For Software, IEEE Spectrum,
Sept. 1998, at 47 (providing examples of related imminent
date change and computer programming problems).
8 The on-going dialogue about the Year 2000 Problem
and its potential impact, and the sizable collection of written
commentary on the issue, suggest that no one-layman and
technologist alike-truly knows what will happen when the cal-
endar advances to January 1, 2000 from December 31, 1999.
See, e.g., Frances Cairncross, Survey: The Millennium Bug,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1998, at 1; Steven Levy & Katie Hafner,
The Day The World Shuts Down, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1997, at 53;
tomated and intelligent systems and components
such as computers and software. They also reveal
our collective vulnerability. Fewer individuals will
be cognizant of the existence of these intelligent
and automated systems and applications. Fewer
individuals will know how to repair them, and still
fewer individuals will really understand their in-
ner-workings. The Nation and the global commu-
nity would be well-advised to be vigilant in ensur-
ing that there is increased reliability, flexibility
and fault-tolerance built into future technology
platforms.
II. THE FIRST GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE:
THE YEAR 2000 PROBLEM
The first taste of the anxiety and difficulty (e.g.,
technical, economic, regulatory and legal) that we
can expect from our growing dependence on
technology is most assuredly the Year 2000 Prob-
lem. It is one of the most pressing issues currently
facing our Nation and the world today. In recent
months, public attention has been drawn to the
effects that the Year 2000 Problem will have on
unprepared computers, automated and intelli-
gent systems, and microprocessor-controlled ma-
chines that are used virtually in all industries of
the global economy. There are wildly differing
scenarios, ranging from "business-as-usual" to
apocalyptic, that suggest that there is much about
the Year 2000 Problem that is hard to predict.8
What is known, however, is that thousands of leg-
acy networks, systems and applications exist that
were not designed to account for the millennial
date change on January 1, 2000. As a conse-
quence, the Year 2000 Problem, if not addressed
properly, could affect various important sectors of
the domestic and global economy, including en-
Neil Munro, The Big Glitch, NATIONALJOURNAL, June 20, 1998,
at 1422; Douglas Stanglin & Shaheena Ahmad, Year 2000
Time Bomb, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 8, 1998, at 45;
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Double-Zero Hour Looms For Historic Re-
pair job, WASH. Posr, Aug. 2, 1998, at Al. Compare Chris
O'Malley, Apocalypse Not, TIME, June 15, 1998, at 62 ("while
there are more than a few fatalists ... most of the folks re-
sponsible for fixing the nation's electronic infrastructure ac-
tually think we're going to make it into the next millennium
with only minor, if any, disruptions of vital services") (empha-
sis added) with Edward Yardeni, Year 2000 Recession? (visited
Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.yardeni.com/y2kbook.htm>
(self-described "alarmist" predicts "[i]f the disruptions are




ergy, transportation, and financial and securities
services.
The implications of the millennial date change
problem are especially significant for the commu-
nications industry. Hundreds of millions of users
of communications services throughout the coun-
try transmit voice, data and video information
through a communications infrastructure com-
posed of the wireline telephone networks, cellular
and personal communications system ("PCS")
networks, satellite constellations, broadcasting
and cable television systems, and the Internet.
Many critical programs, such as Defense Depart-
ment command and control, Federal Reserve
electronic fund transfers, and Medicare benefit
payments, also depend upon this ubiquitous infra-
structure and, consequently, could be seriously af-
fected if the Year 2000 Problem interrupts tele-
phone and data networking services. Senator
Robert F. Bennett, Chairman of the Senate Spe-
cial Committee on the Year 2000 Technology
Problem, was right on the mark when he labeled
the "global [ ]communications infrastructure ...
the central nervous system of modern society."9
III. OVERVIEW OF THE YEAR 2000
PROBLEM
Simply stated, the Year 2000 Problem 0 is the
inability of unprepared computers and other re-
lated automated and intelligent systems to process
the millennial date change that will occur on Jan-
uary 1, 2000. In the 1950s and 1960s, computer
designers and programmers, in order to reduce
the need for expensive computer memory and
9 See Hearing Before The Senate Special Committee On The Year
2000 Technology Problem, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 31, 1998)
(opening remarks of Senator Robert F. Bennett, Chairman,
Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology
Problem).
10 Other terms used are the "Millennium Bug" and the
"Y2K Problem." Moreover, the millennial date change issue
is often referred to as the "Century Date Change Problem"
because several other important dates, prior to and following
the rollover to January 1, 2000, can potentially affect the un-
prepared electronic infrastructure. For example, September
9, 1999-or 9/9/99-is important date because the string of
four 9s is often used by computer designers and program-
mers as a termination code to close or shut down applica-
tions. Another important example is February 2000, which
contains a leap year day (i.e., one additional day that Febru-
ary 1900 did not possess) that automated and intelligent sys-
tems may not be able to process correctly. There are over 12
different computer date change issues that are implicated by
the millennial date rollover.
data storage,'' developed the convention of stor-
ing calendar year dates using only the last two dig-
its for the date year. Thus, the calendar year 1967
was represented as "67." As a consequence, com-
puterized systems and networks may erroneously
assume "00" to be "1900," not "2000," and thereby
not function properly in the year 2000. In some
cases, the hardware and software will continue to
work, but they will generate and process spurious
data that may not be detected for months or even
years.
If you are curious how the truncating of calen-
dar dates from four digits to two could potentially
lead to unintended and unpredictable conse-
quences on January 1, 2000, think of the problem
in practical terms. The ability to process employee
benefits, calculate financial interest, monitor
bank loans, and many other important activities
depend upon the ability of computers and
software applications to determine elapsed time
by taking a "start date" and subtracting it from an
"end date." For example, a typical corporate
human resources department has relatively so-
phisticated computer hardware and software to
record and calculate a variety of date-sensitive
data, including length of company service, as well
as period-in-time to accession, promotion, or ter-
mination. On January 1, 1999, when the com-
puter calculates the company service of an em-
ployee who started with Company X on January 1,
1967, the computer subtracts "67" from "99" and
outputs "32" years of company service (e.g., 99 - 67
= 32). On January 1, 2000, when the recalculates
the employee's company service it outputs incor-
I I The genesis of the Year 2000 Problem can be attrib-
uted to the legitimate concerns and deliberations about the
costs and space requirements associated with computer mem-
ory. See, e.g., Richard Comerford & Tekla S. Perry, Brooding
On The Year 2000, IEEE Spectrum,June 1998, at 71-72; Cairn-
cross, supra note 8. Corporate executives, information tech-
nologists, and others found it necessary to think of their nas-
cent automated and intelligent systems-very often, huge
assemblies of cabinets filled with vacuum tubes, and later
magnetic cores, for main memory-in the practical terms of
computer-storage requirements, financial costs and limita-
tion of physical space. Id. The two-digit calendar year con-
vention has been lambasted as "penny-wise and pound-fool-
ish" but in reality the solution allowed designers and
programmers to save valuable money and space. In its Sep-
tember 19, 1998 survey of the Year 2000 Problem, the Econo-
mist magazine noted the "cost of one megabyte of magnetic
disk storage (enough for a solid novel) in 1965 was $762,
compared with 75 cents today and perhaps 34 cents in 2000."
Cairncross, supra note 8.
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rectly "-67" years (e.g., 00 - 67 = -67). 12 This erro-
neous output might crash the computer system or
merely result in inaccurate data.
While many designers and programmers real-
ized thirty or forty years ago that the two-digit cal-
endar year convention would not work for years
after 1999, they assumed that the computer appli-
cations they were developing would be obsolete
and replaced long before the Year 2000 Problem
became apparent or serious. 13 Unfortunately
much of the mission-critical software that compa-
nies and individuals rely upon still uses this con-
vention.
Another area of concern-and one that most
government departments and agencies and pri-
vate industry recognize as equally problematic
and dangerous-is the microprocessor problem.
The Year 2000 Problem may affect thousands of
microprocessor-controlled systems and machines
(which make use of billions of microprocessors,
or so-called computer "microchips").' 4  These
microchips, which are the hardware equivalent of
unprepared computer software, are hardwired
into all types of machines and equipment that are
used daily throughout the world. From a con-
sumer's perspective, microchips are used in the
toaster oven, the video cassette recorder, the car
engine, and many other appliances. Relatedly, in
critical industry sectors and infrastructures,
microchips are used in environmental and cli-
mate systems, command and control systems,
power distribution systems and communications
systems.
12 The foregoing is only a hypothetical example of the
potential unintended effect of the Year 2000 Problem and is
in no way a definitive example.
13 See Comerford & Perry, supra note 11, at 72.
14 According to the Gartner Group, Inc., a private con-
sulting firm, there are approximately four billion
microprocessors currently used in everything from the aver-
age modern automobile, to transoceanic supertankers, to au-
tomated industrial process machines, to any variety of com-
putational and medical equipment. See Munro, supra note 8,
at 1424-25. Some of the four billion microchips-roughly 160
million, or 4 percent-performed some date-related function.
Id. at 1425. Using Gartner's estimate of 160 million poten-
tially affected microprocessors, "industry would have to find
and fix about 288,000 defective chips every days between now
and the end of 1999." Id.
15 See Chandrasekaran, supra note 8, at Al ("[Y2K] is one
of the most expensive, labor-intensive, time-consuming
problems mankind has ever faced.") (remarks of Ann K. Cof-
fou, Analyst, Giga Information Group, Inc.).
16 It is still unclear, at this juncture, what will be the fi-
IV. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE YEAR
2000 PROBLEM?
Fixing embedded networks, systems and appli-
cations requires computer designers and pro-
grammers to go line-by-line through billions of
lines of code to correct the way the software calcu-
lates dates. In many cases, microprocessors need
to be replaced. Both types of remediation efforts
require the dedication of a tremendous number
of knowledgeable expert personnel 15 and the allo-
cation of significant financial resources.1 6 The
technical solutions are without a doubt available
or, at a minimum, implementable. However, the
time-consuming, resource-intensive nature of the
domestic and global Year 2000-readiness effort de-
mands, in light of the immovable deadline, a flexi-
ble, efficient and effective solution comparable in
some respects only to a nation preparing for war.
The Year 2000 Problem thus begs the question,
"What might happen on January 1, 2000, if there
is not a concerted, effective and comprehensive
attack directed to remediate various embedded
legacy networks, systems and applications?" Tech-
nologists and computer experts reveal that it is
impossible to predict with any level of confidence
what types of disruptions and failures that Year
2000-incidents would precipitate. However, this
problem has already cropped up resulting in tell-
ing serious malfunctions and disruptions.
17
Consider the following situations that have re-
cently occurred. Banks have had to correct loan
processing software that could not calculate ten-
nancial impact of the Year 2000 Problem. The Gartner
Group's frequently cited estimate puts the total price tag at
approximately $300 billion to $600 billion. See Steve Pren-
tice, Telecomms And The Year 2000-IT Problem, Or Global Crisis?,
Gartner Group, Inc., at 2 (1998). J.P. Morgan Securities,
Inc., and Merrill Lynch, Inc., respectively, have forecasted
$200 billion and $1 trillion. See William D. Rabin, Industry
Analysis: The Year 2000 Problem, J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.,
July 22, 1996, at 6 & 7 <http://www.jpmorgan.com/
MarketDataInd/Research/Year2000/960722TH.PDF>; see
also The Millennium Challenge, Merrill Lynch, Inc. (July
1998) <http://www.ml.com/woml/forum/millen_f.htm>;
Chandrasekaran, supra note 8, at Al (examples of costs to
Citibank, MCI, and others); Mark E. Konrad, Countdown To
1/1/00: Solving The "Year 2000 Problem ", Nevada Lawyer, at 14
(June 1998); Munro, supra note 8, at 1423.
17 The Washington Post reported, as part of its three-part
Year 2000 series, that "[m]ore than four in 10 U.S. compa-
nies, according to one survey, already have encountered Y2K-




year loans because it could not tell the difference
between 2003 and 1903. A corned beef manufac-
turer destroyed new inventory because its legacy
computer system believed that the fresh product
was almost 100 years old. In 1998, when Chrysler
Corporation conducted a Year 2000 test at one of
its assembly plants, the simulated millennial date
change affected the facility's security system and
prevented any people from leaving the building."'
A merchant sued a computer hardware company
for selling point-of-sale credit card readers that
purportedly could not process authorizations of
credit cards with expiration dates in 2000.1
The risks, however, are not confined to the di-
rect effects of a Year 2000 failure. There may also
arise secondary, or "echo," effects stemming from
the Year 2000 Problem. 20 For example, some
companies may experience problems associated
with billing and accounting processes. The delay
in collections and the resulting shortfall in reve-
nue could theoretically lead to a company's in-
ability to pay salaries and retain personnel who
are essential for the uninterrupted provision of
services. These problems are not directly attribu-
table to the Year 2000 Problem (i.e., a technical
manifestation), but they can affect a company's
ability to provide commercial services impacting
employees and consumers. Relatedly, there is
also a need to consider public or crowd psychol-
ogy (i.e., the perceptions and responses of con-
sumers) when dealing with the millennial date
change issue. If consumers are overly sensitized
to the doomsday and alarmist reports that are so
widely reported and they encounter a disruption
in an essential service, even if the failure arises
from a non-Year 2000 incident, then unintended
(and equally catastrophic) consequences could
unfold.
For example, the Federal Communications
Commission is worried about the possibility that
on the fateful day, millions of telecommunica-
18 See, e.g., Chandrasekaran, supra note 8 at Al (example
of Year 2000-related failures); Konrad, supra note 16, at 14;
Munro, supra note 8, at 1424.
19 Several litigation actions already have been filed in
connection with purported Year 2000-related incidents or
failures. See infra section V.A.1 & notes 34-35. The first of all
Year 2000 suits, however, was Produce Palace Int'l v. TEC-
America Corp., No. 97-3330-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct.) (filed July 11,
1997) <http://www.2000law.com/myhtml/Produce.htm>.
In that litigation action, the plaintiff Produce Palace
purchased a $10,000 cash register system from the defend-
ant, and according to the plaintiff's complaint, in early 1997,
tions users will pick up their phones to find out if
there is dialtone. The public switched telephone
network is not engineered to have millions of
users pick up the telephone at the same time and
dial; rather the network is optimized for a certain
number of users (albeit a high number of users),
dialing and talking for a certain number of min-
utes. If millions of users pick up the telephone at
or near the same time then it is theoretically possi-
ble that certain parts of the network could experi-
ence a disruption, but not because of the Year
2000 issue. In the banking context, customers
may attempt to withdraw money from their bank's
ATM and discover that the ATM will not disperse
money. Perhaps the ATM is experiencing a Year
2000 glitch, but equally plausible is the possibility
that the money machine is out-of-cash or out-of-
service, common reasons for such machines to be
disabled.
What will be the consequence of a large
number of users that discover there is no dialtone
or ATM service, not because of a Year 2000 fail-
ure, but because of the constant alarmist reports
that have convinced those telecommunications
users and bank customers that it is nothing other
than a Year 2000 incident? Will the public psyche
be so consumed with fear and doubt that a non:
Year 2000 incident will manifest itself in panic and
runs on food stores and money supply? Of
course, no one knows, but we should be mindful
of the attending psychology impacts.
V. COMMUNICATIONS AND THE YEAR 2000
PROBLEM
Luckily the Year 2000 Problem has not ad-
versely affected the normal day-to-day operations
of the ubiquitous communications infrastructure
over which the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (the "Commission" or "FCC") 21 has express
statutory oversight. Nevertheless, there is a tre-
the computerized system crashed and had to be re-booted
any time the point-of-sale readers attempted to process a
credit authorization of a credit card with an expiration date
of "00" or later. Id. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, breach of
warranty, breach of contract and consumer fraud. Id.
20 Frances Cairncross of the Economist, at the October 16,
1998 Global Year 2000 Summit in London, first termed and
commented on the "echo" effects of the Year 2000 Problem.
21 The Federal Communications Commission is an in-
dependent United States government agency, charged with
regulating interstate and international communications by
radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The FCC'sjurisdic-
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mendous amount of public concern about the
pace and extent of remediation activities in the
communications industry. There have been illus-
trative examples of network disruptions in the
non-Year 2000 context, including America On-
line's system failure in 1996,22 and the AT&T
frame relay network incident 23 and PanAmSat's
Galaxy IV satellite failure 24 in 1998, that have
been prominently featured in the general media.
These events have only hastened public concern
about the communications industry's readiness
and capacity to implement Year 2000 compliance
remedies. Hundreds of millions of communica-
tions users in the United States transmit voice,
data and video information upon the ubiquitous
communications infrastructure, and each de-
pends on the network for its near unfailing relia-
bility, continuity, and usability.
A. Challenges For Making Communications
Year 2000-Compliant
Of course, there are several challenges associ-
ated with making the communications infrastruc-
ture Year 2000-compliant that will squarely con-
front the communications industry. First and
foremost, there is the obvious challenge of mak-
ing all mission-critical systems and components
Year 2000-ready before January 1, 2000. As we ap-
proach the immovable deadline of the Millen-
nium, companies and organizations will have to
engage in the prioritization of implementing solu-
tions. C. Michael Armstrong, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of AT&T Corporation and
tion covers interstate and foreign wireline communications
among the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. pos-
sessions and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for
communications purposes. In addition to addressing those
issues that are directly within its jurisdiction, the Commis-
sion-as a principal member on the President's Council on
Year 2000 Conversion-is directly responsible for coordinating
the federal government's Year 2000 effort in the communica-
tions industry.
22 On August 6, 1996, America Online experienced a 19-
hour outage when new host software, essential to the on-line
service provider's operating system, went off-line. See David
S. Hilzenrath, American Online Goes Off-Line, THE WASHINC-
TON POST, Aug. 8, 1996, at Al. Approximately 6.3 million
AOL users worldwide were temporarily unable to access elec-
tronic mail or otherwise use on-line services and functions
(e.g., electronic news, World Wide Web). See id.
23 Thousands of AT&T customers were affected by the
disruption of an advanced frame relay network in April 1998.
For nearly 20 hours, widespread problems impaired the abil-
ity of frame relay customers to utilize the high-speed, packet-
Chairman of the Network Reliability and Inter-
operability Council, punctuated this fact when he
noted at the Council's first meeting that an AT&T
analysis found that testing every potentially vul-
nerable system in the AT&T network would re-
quire 60,000 test years to complete.
25
Second, as described in Section IV, remedying
the Year 2000 Problem in the communications in-
dustry will demand the commitment of tremen-
dous personnel and capital resources. 26 For ex-
ample, GTE Telephone Operations has dedicated
1,200 employees to the company's preparedness
effort. Other companies are committing similar
levels of personnel resources and spending in ex-
cess of $400-$500 million.
Third, there appears to be a lack of clear gui-
dance on the question "What does it mean to be
Year 2000-compliant?" A striking absence of com-
mon definitions related to the Year 2000 Problem
presently exists. Firms and companies often re-
sort to the ambiguous terms "compliant," "ready,"
"functional" and "capable." If one were to survey
the different definitions proffered by governmen-
tal and private entities, one would be surprised to
learn that they are vague and varying.
For example, the Federal government defines
Year 2000 compliance in section 39.002 of the
Federal Acquisition Regulations:
Year 2000 compliant means, with respect to informa-
tion technology, that the information technology accu-
rately processes date/time data (including, but not lim-
ited to, calculating, comparing, and sequencing) from,
into, and between the twentieth and twenty-first centu-
ries, and the years 1999 and 2000 and leap year calcula-
tions, to the extent that other information technology,
switched data network technology to transmit and exchange
large amounts of computer information. See TR DAiLY,
AT&T Says Most Customers' Frame Relay Service Restored, Ac-
knowledges 'Root' Cause Of Network Failure Unknown, Apr. 14,
1998.
24 In May 1998, PanAmSat's Galaxy IV satellite malfunc-
tioned and spun out of control, interrupting the transmission
of radio and television broadcasts and disrupting paging serv-
ices to 80-90 percent of Nation's approximately 40 million
pager users. See Mike Mills, Errant Communications Satellite
Cause Pager, TVDisruptions, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 20,
1998, at C14.
25 GTE Telephone Operations estimates that the
number of tests that would be required to test all combina-
tions of its equipment and operating systems would be excep-
tionally high-1029 . Attempting to perform that number of
tests in the time remaining, i.e., less than 13 months, is simply
impossible even if adequate test beds and other facilities were
available to facilitate such testing.
26 See, e.g., supra section IV & note 17 (describing the
breadth of the costs and liabilities facing corporations).
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used in combination with the information technology
being acquired, properly exchanges date/time data
with it.
2 7
A "compliant" product, according to the Hew-
lett-Packard Company, "accurately processes date
data (including, but not limited to: calculating,
comparing and sequencing dates), from, into and
between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,
the years 1999 and 2000, and leap year calcula-
tions, when used in accordance with its product
documentation, and provided all other products
used in combination with the product properly
exchange data with it."28
SBC Communications, Inc. prefers 'Year 2000
ready" and provides the following definition: "the
system or service must successfully pass the inven-
tory, assessment, testing and implementation
phases and, to the extent applicable, be able to
read, compute, store, process, display and print
calendar dates falling after December 31, 1999,
without interruption or degradation to service." 29
So does the question "What does it mean to be
Year 2000 compliant?" mean that every individual
mission-critical element and component in a sys-
tem is certified, and, if so, what is the conse-
quence when all of the Year 2000-compliant ele-
ments are re-connected and the process or
function does not work? What happens if Firm X
uses a definition, standard and process methodol-
ogy which is wholly different from Firm Y, and,
when the two firms interconnect, there is not con-
tinuity of service and errors and failures arise?
Unfortunately, the truth is that individual critical
elements and components that alone are 'Year
2000 compliant" may not be capable of perform-
ing their specific functions because of the various
methods for reaching compliance.
At some level, the definitional problem may
prove unimportant. What really matters is that
27 Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 39.002
(1996).
28 Hewlett-Packard Company's Year 2000 Compliance
Definition <http://www.hp.com/year2000/compliance.htm>
(visited Nov. 11, 1998).
29 SBC Communications, Inc.'s Year 2000 Readiness Def-
inition <http://www.sbc.com/News/y2k.htm> (visited Nov.
11, 1998).
30 There has been no shortage of commentary and dis-
course on the potential legal consequences arising from the
Year 2000 Problem and the possibility of significant legal liti-
gation before and after January 1, 2000. See, e.g., Kathy Bar-
rett Carter, Lawyers Boot Up For Y2K Crashes, THE STAR-
LEDGER, Aug. 4, 1998, at 1; Mark E. Konrad, Countdown To 1/
1/00: Solving The "Year 2000 Problem", NEVADA LAWYER, at 14
systems and services remain functional through
critical date rollovers. The assurance of that is de-
pendent on the exhaustive testing of a
remediated system irrespective of what definitions
are adopted. In short, if the mission-critical
processes, services and functions continue to work
then it should not matter that the components
might not meet a given definition of Year 2000
compliance.
1. Legal And Regulatory Liability Concerns
Without a doubt, in the Year 2000 Problem con-
text, legal and regulatory liability issues are the
most significant barriers to the dissemination of
timely and candid information about the Year
2000 readiness efforts of carriers, service provid-
ers, and manufacturers that are critical to
remediating the problem. 3°1 The legal concerns
proffered by industry-some that appear to be over-
stated and some that appear to be legitimate-are
associated in part with issues of product dispar-
agement, antitrust violations, third-party liability,
and carrier-vendor contractual relations, just to
name a few. As a consequence, some companies
have been reluctant to divulge information per-
taining to their Year 2000 vulnerabilities and have
been largely unwilling to guarantee or certify Year
2000-readiness due to concerns about liability.
With respect to the Year 2000 Problem, the rea-
sons for the concern and uneasiness expressed
about legal liability are apparent. Certain gloom-
and-doom reports suggest that on January 1, 2000,
50% of companies may experience a Year 2000-
incident affecting part or all of their systems. 31 If
the forecasts are even marginally accurate, on Jan-
uary 1, 2000, many affected companies could be
subject to a wide-range of potential liability. In
(June 1998); J. Travis Laster, The Year 2000 Problem In Dela-
ware: Preparing To Defend Shareholder Derivative Law Suits, IN-
SIGHTS, at 12 (June 1998);James K. Lehman & Kevin A. Hall,
Year 2000 For Lawyers: A Legal Primer On The Millennium Bug,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYER, at 15 (July/Aug. 1998); Linda A.
Monica, Year 2000: The Gathering Storm Of Litigation Over The
"Millennium Bug, MAINE BARJOuRNAL, at 184-85 (July 1998) ;
Dean A. Morehous, Jr., Liability Issues And The Year 2000,
Practising Law Institute, 18th Annual Institute on Computer
Law (Feb. 1998); Ronald Rosenberg, Lawyers Cashing In On
Y2K Liability Problems, THE JouRNAL REcoRD, Feb. 5, 1998;
Anna Snider, The Millennium Has Arrived For Y2K Practice
Groups, NEW YoRK LAW JouRNAL, May 11, 1998, at 1.
31 See Monica, supra note 30, at 185.
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fact, it is interesting to note that the cost to eradi-
cate the Millennium Bug ($300 billion to $600 bil-
lion) pales in comparison to provocative estimates
of legal costs in the range of $1 trillion.
s2
A small number of class action suits already
have been filed in both state and federal courts.
Most pending actions deal with "goods" (e.g., com-
puter software and intelligent systems) purchased
between calendar years 1994 and 1997. Plaintiffs
seek relief under several different causes of ac-
tion, including a federal Magnuson-Moss Act
claim and state law claims such as breach of war-
ranty, breach of contract, consumer fraud, mis-
representation, and negligence. 3
The Produce Palace International v. TEC-America
Corp. lawsuit was the first Year 2000 litigation ac-
tion, brought in the Circuit Court for the County
of Macomb, State of Michigan.3 4 Plaintiff Pro-
duce Palace bought a computer system to network
their cash registers, process credit cards and expe-
dite accounting. The Plaintiff alleged that the sys-
tem was installed in 1995 without the ability to
process credit cards expiring on or after January
1, 2000. The Plaintiff alleged breach of warranty
under Michigan law,3 5 violation of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, 36 breach of warranty of fitness
under Michigan law,3 7 breach of duty of good
faith, 38 negligent repair, misrepresentation,
breach of contract, and violation of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act."9 The Plaintiff also al-
leged a right under Michigan law to revoke the
transaction due to a lengthy repair history and
continuing defects, and sought a refund of the
purchase price along with incidental and conse-
quential costs. The instant action was settled, sub-
ject to an arrangement reached among the parties
32 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 30, at I ("[L]egal costs
could reach $1 trillion, substantially more than ... businesses
will spend to fix Y2K problems, and more than all the money
spent on Superfund environmental litigation, asbestos, breast
implant and tobacco litigation combined"); Larry Smith &
Lori Tripoli, More Billables Than Superfund!. Law Firms Posi-
tion for the Billion-Dollar Y2K Boom, OF COUNSEL, May 18, 1998,
at 10.
-13 See, e.g., Atlaz Intl, Ltd. v. Software Bus. Technologies Inc.,
No. 172539 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (Dec. 2, 1997) <http://www.
2000law.com/myhtml/atlaz.htm>; Issokson v. Intuit, Inc., No.
CV-773646 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (Apr. 28, 1998) <http://www.
2000law.com/pdt/issokson.pdf>; H. Levenbaum Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. Active Voice Corp., No. 98-3864 (Mass. Super. Ct.) (July
2, 1998) <http://www.2000law.com/pdf/levenbaum.pdf>.
34 See Produce Palace Internat'l v. TEC-America Corp., No. 97-
3330-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct.) (June 12, 1997) <http://




Firms may also be fearful of the prospect of not
complying with the myriad of Year 2000 readiness
and disclosure rules that are promulgated by the
various U.S. regulatory agencies and the potential
adverse consequences of non-compliance. Mak-
ing affirmative representations of Year 2000 com-
pliance or disclosing information about a firm's
readiness activities and potential Year 2000
trouble spots would provide legal ammunition
that could be used against the firm by a regulatory
agency-like the Commission-or another litigant or
class of plaintiffs.
The regulatory landscape is filled with numer-
ous examples of voluntary and mandatory disclo-
sure requirements. The Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") has been perhaps the most
visible regulatory agency when it comes to the
promulgation of information disclosure guide-
lines. In January 1998, the SEC issued a notice-
the so-called "Bulletin no. 5"-regarding the disclo-
sures to be made by public companies and by in-
vestment firms and advisors.41 The SEC's Bulletin
no. 5 was subsequently superseded by an August
4, 1998 interpretative statement regarding the dis-
closure of Year 2000 issues and consequences for
public companies, investment advisors, invest-
ment firms and municipal securities issuers.
42
The SEC noted, in relevant part, that:
[c]ompanies already disclose in their [Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Re-
suits of Operations ("MD&A")] their assessment of
known trends, demands, commitments, events or un-
certainties that are likely to have a material impact.
MD&A is designed to allow investors to see the com-
pany through the eyes of management. Investors de-
serve no less with respect to management's assessment
35 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 440.2314 (West 1998).
s6 See 15 U.S.C. § 2301.
37 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 440.2315 (West 1998).
38 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 440.1203 (West 1998).
39 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.901 (West 1998).
411 See Erich Luening, First Y2K Lawsuit Filed Is Settled,
CNET NEWS.cOM, Sept. 14, 1998 <http://www.news.com/
news/>.
41 See Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 5 (Divisions of Corporation Finance and Invest-
ment Management), Jan. 12, 1998, at 1 <http://www.sec.
gov/rules/othern/slbcf5.htm> (visited Nov. 11, 1998).
42 See Securities and Exchange Commission Statement
Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences
By Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Com-
panies, and Municipal Securities Issuers, Release No. 33-
7558, Aug. 4, 1998, at 1 <http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/
33-7558.htm> (visited Nov. 11, 1998).
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of their company's Year 2000 problems.43
The palpable anxiety and concern of legal and
regulatory liability has thus contributed to an en-
vironment where companies are fearful of disclos-
ing timely and candid information about their
products or services, or how far they have ad-
vanced toward compliance. To address this signif-
icant problem, President Clinton signed the Year
2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, a bi-
partisan legislative initiative to which the telecom-
munications industry and many others substan-
tially contributed and that was enacted by the
Congress, on October 19, 1998. This legislation is
an important part of the country's efforts to pre-
pare for the Year 2000 Problem. It promotes and
encourages the sharing of Year 2000 information
by limiting the liability exposure those statements
might cause.
The Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclo-
sure Act will surely advance the information ex-
change effort. However, additional measures may
be needed on a forward-going basis. There will be
a significant and continuing role to be played by
the Congress, the Administration, and industry
with regard to the legal liability issues and other
barriers to the information flow.
2. Competitive and Marketplace Concerns
Competitive and marketplace concerns are also
significant hindrances to addressing the Year 2000
Problem. A considerable amount of anxiety exists
in the private sector about the attending competi-
tive consequences if companies openly reveal to
customers that they are experiencing difficulties
in remediating their embedded electronics infra-
structure. Some firms are legitimately concerned
about the manner in which they will be treated by
the capital markets. In both instances, companies
could lose the confidence of both their customers
and investors. Even a temporary wavering of con-
fidence might have a tremendous impact on the
financial bottom-line.
There is also a growing chorus of concern in
the private sector about the accounting implica-
tions of the Year 2000 Problem. As noted above,
most U.S. communications carriers, manufactur-
ers, and providers will spend on average $400-
$500 million to attack the Year 2000 issue. In
many cases, there will be substantial spikes in capi-
tal expenditures in a given year. Because such
spikes are often unanticipated and cannot be de-
preciated, the market may react by de-valuing the
company's stock. Many companies are concerned
about how such a single or repeated spike of a
multi-million dollar expenditure will be ac-
counted for in any forward-going quarterly or an-
nual reports, and more importantly how the fi-
nancial markets will respond.
3. The Criticality, Interdependency and Uniqueness
of Communications Services
Few events in the Digital Information Age
(before the Year 2000 Problem) have so clearly
demonstrated the interconnectivity and interde-
pendency of the communications industry. The
communications infrastructure is one of a hand-
ful of basic building blocks-including energy and
transportation-upon which all other industries
and programs rest. It is also disproportionately
dependent on the coupling of various disparate
networks.
If one is particularly interested or concerned
about the public switched telephone network-as
are most critical end-users-then it is important to
remember that no single entity owns or controls
the public switched telephone network. The ma-
jor telecommunications carriers, such as the Bell
Operating Companies, GTE, AT&T, MCI
WorldCom and Sprint, provide service to the ma-
jority of the country. But 1,300 small to mid-size
independent telephone companies serve many ru-
ral and insular parts of the country as well as the
U.S. territories and possessions. Moreover, the to-
tal global network depends as well on different in-
ternational carriers, in different countries around
the world. And these companies are only one in a
long chain of vertically and horizontally-interre-
lated companies required for the network to oper-
ate.
For example, in order to fix the Year 2000 Prob-
lem, carriers rely on manufacturers of central of-
fice switches and other network equipment, like
Northern Telecom, Lucent and Siemens. Private
networks and end users must make sure their
equipment-such as their telephones, voice mail
systems, Private Branch Exchanges ("PBXs"), and




otherwise, they may be unable to send or receive
voice and data traffic. These groups are, in turn,
dependent upon other manufacturers for their
equipment, who are, in turn, dependent yet again
on other providers for parts and services such as
power. And on it goes.
Without a doubt, the telecommunications net-
work is a tremendously complex and interdepen-
dent thing. It consists of millions of intercon-
nected parts and hundreds of millions of lines of
computer code. The public switched telephone
network processes millions of calls per minute.
To transit each and every call, automated and in-
telligent machines and systems (in the possession
of the thousands of telecommunications carriers
and users described above) make calculations for
the most efficient multi-path, real-time interaction
of all points along the established circuit between
the call's origination and destination. 44 In micro-
seconds, a phone call from Washington, D.C. to
New York travels from your telephone, to the Pri-
vate Branch Exchange (i.e., switchboard) in your
building, to the local exchange carrier's central
office switch, through the carrier's network com-
ponents and systems that route your call to an in-
ter-exchange carrier (or carriers), through long-
distance trunk lines (or other telecommunica-
tions facilities like microwave, satellite, fiber op-
tic), to another local exchange carrier's central
switch, and ultimately to the telephone on the
other end. Make the same call two minutes later
and the call may be routed in a completely differ-
ent manner as calculated by the network.
The foregoing description points to the mathe-
matical difficulty (i.e., the infinite number of per-
mutations and combinations of routing possibili-
ties and service events to transit a voice or data
call) of testing the entire public telephone net-
44 See generally Hearing Before The House Committee On Ways
And Means, Subcommittee On Oversight, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
(June 16, 1998) (testimony of A. Gerard Roth, Vice Presi-
dent, Technology Programs, GTE Corporation) <http://
www.house.gov/ways-means/oversite/testmony/6-16-98/6-
16roth.htm> (visited Nov. 11, 1998).
45 See, e.g., supra Part V.A; supra note 26.
46 See Cairncross, supra note 8, at 11 (emphasis added).
47 The Bellcore standard is 99.9999 percent up time,
translating into a switch reliability standard of less than 3
minutes downtime per year. That is 3 minutes of 525,650
minutes in a year.
48 See Ross M. Richardson, Letters To The Editor: Who Will
Win The Telco Wars?, WALl STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 8, 1998, at
A9. Even though the most prominent examples of telecom-
munications disruptions-AT&T frame relay and PanAmSat
work for Year 2000-readiness. 45 If any one of
those components/systems (e.g., central office
switch), network elements (e.g., advance intelli-
gent network, Signaling System 7), or network in-
terconnectors (e.g., local exchange carrier, inter-
exchange carrier, Internet Service Provider,
private telecommunications network user) is af-
fected by the Year 2000 Problem, a call might be
disrupted.
B. Unique Advantages For Remediation in
Communications
It is important to note, however, that as daunt-
ing as the challenges and complexity may appear,
the communications industry is probably better
equipped and positioned to address this issue
than most. As Frances Cairncross of the Economist
noted in her September 19, 1998 survey on the
Year 2000 Problem, critical industry sectors like
communications "depend disproportionately on net-
works and therefore tend to emphasize reliability and
continuity."46 In support of Ms. Cairncross's obser-
vation, there are five very important points.
First, the industry is dependent upon a highly
complex, technical network that is engineered for
near unfailing reliability.4 7 Communications is
not an industry that contemplates periods of
downtime (e.g., evenings, weekends, holidays, or
re-tooling cycles). Communications, quite apart
from other industries, is both a "live" network
running 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and a
industry sector "based on operating a ubiquitous,
shared physical infrastructure. '" 48 The success of
the industry "is measured by the number of customers
mutually connected by the infrastructure, and by the
reliability and usability of these interconnections."49
Success is also measured in terms of revenues,
Galaxy IV-highlight the vulnerability that users may experi-
ence in the event of a serious failure of a single piece of hard-
ware, it is important to note that communications networks
and components are designed to be fault-tolerant, adaptable
and quickly remedied. For example, AT&T was able to im-
plement technical solutions and substantially restore frame
relay service within 20 hours after the initial outage reports.
Moreover, communications failures of this magnitude are
rare. Wayne A. Whiyte, Chief of Spectrum Management at
NASA's Lewis research facility, commenting on Galaxy IV
noted "[s]atellite communications has been in existence for
30 to 40 years now and you can probably count the number
of satellite failures on one hand." See Frank D. Roylance,
Orbiting Switchboard Pulls Plug On U.S., THE BALTIMORE SUN.
May 21, 1998, at 1A.
49 See Richardson, supra note 48, at A9 (emphases ad-
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subscribership, dividends, and profits. The major
telecommunications carriers and providers under-
stand well that they potentially face diminished
goodwill, regulatory trouble,
50 and legal liability5'
if they do not satisfactorily address the Year 2000
problem. Let us not forget that the industry is
also susceptible to financial ruin.52 For example,
in the case of PanAmSat's Galaxy IV, the satellite
failure foreclosed any possibility of the company
(a publicly traded subsidiary of Hughes Electron-
ics) collecting an estimated $78 million in reve-
nues for 1998, and reportedly could lead to a $20
million revenue shortfall in both 1998 and 1999
from the loss of all pre-empted users of the newer
Galaxy VI satellite.
5-3
In this new competitive landscape of telecom-
munications, profit-maximizing actors will act in
their own self-interest, namely to survive and pros-
per.54 The captains of industry that are most sus-
ceptible to the risks and fears of competition,
wake to and work through each day thinking
about the negative consequences of not providing
quality, reliability, and increasingly innovative
services and products. The corresponding impact
can be felt in the anxiety they feel about satisfying
regulators, shareholders and customers.
Second, the aforementioned legacy of reliabil-
ity and continuity evidences that companies have
a strong stable of trained, reliable experts in net-
work reliability issues. They have experience with
identifying threats to network reliability, planning
corrections and executing those corrections. In
the past, they pulled the entire network apart dur-
ing the AT&T divestiture and implemented toll-
free 800 number portability and local number
portability. Perhaps the most analogous example
of the industry reconfiguring the live network to
remedy a "number" issue was when, due to the de-
ded).
50 See supra Part V.A.1.
51 See, e.g., id.; supra Notes 34-35.
52 Concerned users of communications service are often
quick to point to the AOL service interruption and the AT&T
data relay outage, but they forget about the devastating effect
on the financial bottom-lines of two of the largest firms in the
communications industry. See, e.g., Jeff Jinnett, Legal Issues
Confronting the Federal Government and State Govern-
ments Due to the Year 2000 "Millennium Bug" (1996)
("[when AOL] went off-line for less than one day.. .its stock
dropped approximately three points... the market value of
the outstanding AOL stock was reduced by approximately
$273 million") <http://ww-w.comlinks.com/links/jjin2.htm>
(visited Nov. 11, 1998); Gavin Souter & Michael Prince,
AT&T Fails To Connect: Failure Of Frame Relay Network High-
pletion of the country's telephone number pool,
the industry added the three-digit area code. In
essence, the domestic telecommunications indus-
try implemented a three-digit technical solution, as
opposed to the two-digit solution required for the
Year 2000 Problem.
Third, because of the importance of network
reliability, continuity, interconnectivity and inter-
operability, there are a number of first class tech-
nical consortiums and prominent trade organiza-
tions that have a long history of developing
standards and addressing network issues and then
sharing those findings with all its members.
Bellcore has served in this role for the phone sys-
tem since days of old. The Telco Year 2000 Fo-
rum, the Alliance for Telecommunications Indus-
try Solutions ("ATIS"), and other industry groups
are providing valuable assistance in facilitating in-
formation sharing, building private partnerships,
and coordinating testing and contingency plan-
ning.
The Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council ("NRIC") is another important tool the
Commission and the industry will use to assist
them in their effort to address the Year 2000 Prob-
lem. The newly constituted NRIC-which includes
representatives from all the communications in-
dustries, including broadcast and cable, as well as
equipment manufacturers and On-line Service
Providers ("OSP")-will play an important over-
sight role with respect to interoperability and end-
to-end testing. We believe that this organization
will be invaluable in coordinating the overall test-
ing, collection and dissemination of information,
in addition to advising the Federal Communica-
tions Commission on the status of industry readi-
ness and facilitating the development of contin-
gency plans.
lights Risks In Telecommunications, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Apr.
20, 1998, at I (AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong "would not say
how much AT&T would lose in revenue. . .however, he said
the frame relay business generates $1 billion annually for
AT&T").
5 See, e.g., Diane Mermigas, Satellite Risk Is Out There,
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 1, 1998, at 18; Anthony L. Velocci,
Jr., Market Focus, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June
1, 1998, at 11
54 See Alfred E. Kahn, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1 (1970) (citing I Adam Smith,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 421 (Edwin Canaan ed., 4th ed. 1925) (1776)); see
also Ernest Gellhorn & William E. Kovacic, ANTITRUST LAw
AND ECONOMICS 48-50 (1994).
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The states are also important assets in the Com-
mission's effort to ensure that the integrity and
continued operations of the nation's critical com-
munications infrastructure is maintained. As a
consequence, the Commission has engaged the
support of the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners ("NARUC") and is specifi-
cally working with its Communications Subcom-
mittee to ensure that telecommunications compa-
nies are aware of the seriousness and
consequences of the Year 2000 Problem, to pro-
vide information and guidance about the prob-
lem, to provide remedial actions and solutions,
and to assess the extent and pace with which the
telecommunications industry is addressing the
problem.
In totality, the Telco Year 2000 Forum, ATIS,
Bellcore, NRIC, the States, and other industry
groups are providing valuable assistance in facili-
tating information sharing, building private part-
nerships, and coordinating testing and contin-
gency planning.
Fourth, most communications firms have con-
tingency plans and continuity of operations
procedures for potential non-Year 2000 related
disruption scenarios. The industry has also estab-
lished mutual assistance procedures in the event
of a particularly debilitating failure where com-
petitors will assist by carrying the affected carrier's
or provider's voice, data or video traffic on their
excess capacity. These plans and procedures can
be coopted and specifically modified for the Year
2000 Problem. Given the ultimate importance of
contingency preparedness, the fact that such
plans and procedures exist in some form or an-
other will greatly contribute to the industry's abil-
ity to react to any potential Year 2000 incident.
Fifth, the great bulk of the communications in-
frastructure is largely controlled by a relatively few
carriers, providers, and manufacturers. For exam-
ple, in the United States, the top 20 local ex-
change and interexchange carriers control more
than 97 percent of the total number of U.S. access
lines. In the manufacturing context, the majority
of the domestic and international telecommunica-
tions industry's equipment comes from Lucent,
Alcatel, Siemens, Northern Telecom, Fujitsu, and
a handful of others.
VI. READINESS EFFORTS BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY
The Commission has taken its responsibility to
monitor the pace and extent of the communica-
tions industry's Year 2000 readiness efforts seri-
ously since first becoming aware of the problem
several years ago and has been working to ensure
that the Year 2000 challenge is properly ad-
dressed. We have developed and continue to de-
velop outreach and advocacy strategies to raise in-
dustry awareness of the issue, as well as methods
for assessing and monitoring the industries' ef-
forts to address the problem. Moreover, we have
been looking into ways to facilitate the develop-
ment of effective contingency plans in the event
that a major disruption to any segment of the
communications industry-including wireline te-
lephony, terrestrial wireless, radio and television
broadcasting, cable television, satellites, and inter-
national telecommunications-should occur.
Inasmuch as the Commission can play an im-
portant role by providing information and gui-
dance to companies, encouraging companies to
share information with each other and with their
customers, and facilitating the development of
readiness and contingency plans, the Commis-
sion's ability to address the Year 2000 Problem is
limited. Only private communications firms them-
selves have the ability to address properly the Year
2000 Problem. As a consequence, we have been
working to promote a flexible (but effective) pub-
lic-private, "mission-oriented" partnership to en-
sure that users of communications services enjoy
as close to the same level of quality and reliability
on and after January 1, 2000, as they do today.
In the time we have remaining, we will have to
marshal efficiently the unique skills and resources
of the public and private sector to fix the net-
works and systems that we absolutely need to have
and to minimize Year 2000-related disruptions in
this country and around the world. With the help
of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conver-
sion, the Administration, the U.S. Congress, the
Federal Communications Commission, the indus-
try and others, we will substantially meet the Year
2000 challenge, but it will take the contribution
and commitment of each of us to achieve it. As
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Henry Stimson noted, "I know the withering ef-
fect of limited commitments and I know the re-
generative effort of full action."
VII. CONCLUSION
In the midst of one of the most difficult and
dire periods in the 2 0 th century, Winston Church-
ill once remarked, "Victory at all costs, victory in
spite of all terror, victory however long and hard
the road may be." At the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Sir Churchill's words resonate
fully, for we are optimists and believe that we are
participating in one of the greatest undertakings
of the day.
Of course, as we move closer to the Millen-
nium, all of our concerns become more acute.
Because our collective well-being is dependent
upon the reliability of all the nation's and world's
telecommunications networks, government and
industry must work together to ensure that
whatever disruptions occur do not lead to wide-
spread outages and failures. In this regard, the
Commission is fully committed to taking whatever
actions it can to facilitate information sharing and
industry compliance efforts. Time is of the es-
sence. We cannot move this deadline of January
1, 2000.

